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Abstract 
The Employment Relations Act 2000 has as a core value the settling of employment relationship problems at the lowest 
level practicable. Mediation plays a prominent part in this process. A key issue in the mediation process is the 
application of confidentiality. Through review of significant cases determined by the Employment Relations Authority, 
Employment Court and the Court of Appeal, this paper examines the development and application of confidentiality 
within the mediation process in New Zealand. The Paper finds that while the law is well developed ethical and public 
interest issues remain. Further judicial and parliamentary consideration is called for. 
Introduction  
The object of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA) 
is:  
(a) to build productive employment relationships  
… (v) by promoting mediation as the primary 
problem-solving mechanism; and (vi) by reducing 
the need for judicial intervention; (s3 ERA, 2000, 
p.6).  
To achieve these ends s148 ERA provides the mediation 
process with a cloak of confidentiality.  But a number of 
exceptions are noted (s148(6). And as with any statute, 
legal interpretation and guidance has been necessary over 
the extent and application of s148 ERA.  
Mediation has existed in some form since the Industrial, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894. A significant 
uptake of mediation for individual grievances occurred in 
the early 1990’s (Barker, 2004), with statutory mediation 
provided under the Employment Contracts Act 1991. But 
mediation has not been without controversy. When 
preparing the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules in 1979, 
Professor Sanders questioned whether confidentiality 
could be absolute (van Ginkel, 2005). Commenting on the 
Employment Tribunal’s separation of mediation from 
adjudication Skiffington (1993) noted that “Arguably the 
current system has attempted to accommodate the legal 
and practical, leaving equity issues yet to be adequately 
addressed” (p.52). And in respect of ethics, Gardiner 
(1993) stated that “mediations are conducted in the 
shadows of the law” (p.343), inferring that parties use 
mediation not for the purpose of settlement but to assess 
the strength of their opponents case. Other ethical issues 
identified by Spiller (2001) include the conflict between 
the parties right of self-determination with the mediators 
obligation to assist the parties to settle, what a mediator 
should do if a settlement contains an illegality, what if 
one of the parties thwarts legislative intent by not acting 
in good faith, and the conflict between a mediators 
impartiality and the public interest need to protect 
vulnerable parties.  
New Zealand Case Law 
Crummer v Benchmark Building Supplies Ltd 
[2000] 
A convenient starting place to examine the legal 
interpretation and development of mediation 
confidentiality, and its exceptions, as held by the 
specialist employment institutions, is Crummer. A full 
bench of the Employment Court heard the case. 
Crummer alleged he was unjustifiably dismissed. 
Employment Tribunal mediation occurred (the case was 
heard under the Employment Contracts Act 1991) at 
which the parties expressly agreed that it was on a 
confidential and without prejudice basis. The mediation 
was unsuccessful. For the adjudication Crummer’s lawyer 
sought disclosure and admissibility of a document 
prepared for and produced at the mediation hearing. The 
respondent refused. The case was removed to the 
Employment Court. 
The Court held that there were four questions to be 
answered: 
“(i) whether statements made in mediation, if 
reduced to writing, were discoverable in 
subsequent adjudication proceedings, (ii) whether 
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such statement were admissible in evidence, (iii) if 
the answer was ‘no’, whether any exceptions exist, 
and (iv) if they do, in what circumstances would 
exceptions be made?” (pp.5-6). 
The respondent’s statement when they dismissed the 
applicant inferred the sole reason was a threat of violence 
against another employee. But in the document presented 
at mediation the respondent noted that they considered 
other factors. The applicant argued that the mediation 
statement was not privileged because 1) it was not 
prepared for the purpose of settling a dispute, but rather 
for justification of the respondents position; 2) because 
the document contained material that gave rise to further 
action; 3) if it were privileged, sufficient public policy 
considerations existed to have the privilege removed; 4) 
equity and good conscience required its admissibility; and 
5) even if it was not admissible, it was still discoverable. 
Crummer argued that the respondent misled him and that 
he would not have agreed to confidentiality had he known 
the real basis for his dismissal. Crummer’s lawyer agreed 
that in general, documents prepared for mediation are not 
admissible in evidence. But he relied on common law to 
argue that without prejudice privilege was subject to 
removal on grounds of public policy and in the interest of 
justice. Also, at common law facts discoverable 
independently of mediation, even if given at mediation, 
are not privileged.  
The respondent’s lawyer argued that mediation 
confidentiality is “almost absolute and would only be 
lifted where there had been an abuse of the mediation 
process” (p.14). She argued that the document had been 
prepared solely for mediation, and thus for the purpose of 
settlement. She argued that removing the absoluteness of 
mediation would reduce its effectiveness and 
acceptability and thereby undermine public policy 
consideration that parties settle without recourse to 
litigation.   
Mr Dumbleton, Chief Mediator of the Employment 
Tribunal, explained that mediation was conducted on a 
confidential and without prejudice basis, that this was 
carefully explained to the parties, and that without this the 
effectiveness of mediation would be considerably 
reduced. In his view, “Confidentiality … underpins and 
enhances the effectiveness of the mediation process.” 
(p.10).   
The Court held that without prejudice statements, 
expressly or impliedly agreed, are not admissible in 
subsequent hearings, except for enforcement purpose. It 
also stated (obiter) that the privilege applied to documents 
prepared for the purpose of reaching a settlement, and 
that would include all documents prepared and presented 
at mediation. But statements made after mediation had 
failed are admissible. Facts that can be obtained 
independently of the mediation are discoverable and 
admissible, “notwithstanding that its existence may have 
been revealed only during the negotiations” (ERNZ, 
2005, p.15). And that privilege cannot be used to conceal 
the fact that one party made a threat against another or to 
pervert the course of justice. The Court noted that public 
policy encouraged mediation and quoted the Court of 
Appeal in Vaucluse Holdings Ltd v Lindsay (1997) 10 
PRNZ 557, 559 (CA) “The whole point of mediation is to 
remove the process from litigation or arbitration and to 
ensure that anything said or done in a mediation does not 
later rebound to the detriment of any party, should the 
mediation fail” (p.20). 
The Court also noted that mediation confidentiality was 
“an implied parliamentary intention that the adjudicator 
should not be or become aware of any admission made 
during attempts at settlement” (p.20). The Court also 
noted “we find there is a much stronger case for 
protection of statements made during mediation than 
there is for protecting agreements between parties that 
their discussions should be without prejudice” (p.21). It 
based this on public policy reason that it was undesirable 
for a mediator to be called to give evidence in any 
subsequent hearing. 
The Court therefore held that the general rule to follow 
was that statements or admissions made in mediation for 
the purpose of settling disputes are not admissible in 
further hearings, unless good public policy grounds 
existed such as the adjudicator would be deceived, 
legislative intent would be thwarted, or the statement give 
rise to further action. 
The Court noted that the issue of disclosure was separate 
from that of admissibility. It held that the document was 
discoverable. But was it admissible? The Court held that 
it was admissible but only if the respondent held to their 
amended brief prepared for adjudication and thus result in 
the Employment Tribunal being misled. It was also 
admissible because based on the facts of the case it would 
not defeat legislative intent, namely that employment 
problems be settled at mediation.   
The Court also made reference to the Employment 
Relations Bill then before Parliament and its provision to 
strengthen mediation confidentiality. In its report back the 
Employment and Accident Insurance Legislation 
Committee (2000) noted that c160 (s148 ERA) of the Bill 
is intended to “prevail over the finding in the “Crummer” 
case, ensuring that mediation is always held on a without 
prejudice basis.  However, we agree that the 
confidentiality should only attach to things said and 
created for the purpose of the mediation and not to pre-
existing evidence” (p.163). 
Moa v Steve Mora [2003]  
The issue for the Authority was whether a discussion, and 
a letter containing information about the discussion, 
between the respondent and a mediation support officer 
of the Department of Labour, was covered by s148 ERA. 
The discussion and letter arose as a result of the officer 
making arrangements for the parties to agree and enter 
into mediation. The question for the Authority was 
whether this discussion was “in the course of the 
mediation” (s148(1)ERA). 
The Authority held that mediation services include the 
provision of information about mediation services 
available. Thus a mediation officer providing information 
and attempting to organise a mediation hearing was doing 
so for the purpose of mediation, and therefore covered by 
s148 ERA. Neither the discussion nor the letter was 
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admissible. This finding is in line with the stated intent of 
the legislation (Employment and Accident Insurance 
Legislation Committee, 2000).     
Shepherd v Glenview Electrical Services Ltd 
[2004] 
Shepherd claimed unjustified dismissal. At his mediation, 
he claimed the employer’s representative told him that the 
reason for his redundancy was that the Principal of the 
site were they were contracted to work had asked that he 
be removed. Based on this statement he had settled at 
mediation, the settlement being duly signed by a 
Department of Labour mediator. It subsequently emerged 
that the Principal had made no such request. Shepherd 
lodged an application with the Authority. The defendant 
asserted that s149(3) ERA prevented the Authority from 
hearing the case. The Authority agreed; where s149 (1) 
and (2) ERA are properly followed s149(3) ERA is an 
absolute bar on the Authority from hearing the case. The 
defendant lodged an application with the Court. 
The Court noted the similarity between Shepherd and 
Crummer. Colgan J stated that “While I respectfully agree 
with The Court’s approach in Crummer which both 
allowed for the maintenance of the integrity of mediation 
and … to also set right injustices, Parliament has rejected 
that balanced approach and has opted for an absolute 
maintenance of mediation integrity at the expense of 
achieving justice” [40]. 
The Court rejected the Authority’s decision that 
s149(3)(b) ERA bars it from hearing the case. One, 
Shepherd was not asking for the terms of the settlement to 
be examined but rather the way the settlement was 
obtained. And secondly, such an examination did not 
constitute “action, appeal, application for review, or 
otherwise” (s149(3)(b) ERA). The Court went on to say 
(obiter) that s149(3)(a) ERA was a stronger argument, 
that is, when properly signed by a mediator the terms of 
the settlement are final and binding. However, that of 
itself is not determinative. The Court stated that: 
“the combined effects of s148(1) and (3) are clear, 
absolute and draconian.  They would even appear 
to make inadmissible evidence of the commission 
of criminal offences by persons in mediation such 
as attempts to pervert the course of justice, 
unlawful threats, and other offences that may be 
committed by one person making a statement to 
another for the purpose of mediation .... it is not 
right that such absolute and unassailable 
confidentiality is required in the interests of justice 
in all cases.” [46]. 
The Court noted that the effect of s148(3) ERA could be 
to defeat the public policy interest of encouraging 
mediation, given that a parties behaviour, no matter how 
reprehensible, was beyond review. Colgan J further noted 
that legislative intent that parties act in good faith could 
be thwarted.  In dismissing the application, Colgan J 
noted that he did “so reluctantly but in consequence of the 
legislation.” [48]. 
Rutledge v Telecom NZ Ltd [2004] 
The issue of good faith during mediation arose in 
Rutledge. The applicant argued that s148 ERA did not 
prevent him presenting evidence of a breach of good 
faith, despite it occurring during mediation.  He sought to 
submit in evidence conversations between the parties and 
the mediator. The Authority held that confidentiality did 
not only apply to written documents, but extended to 
statements. Further, that confidentiality extended to all 
aspects associated with initiation and conclusion, and not 
limited to the mediation discussions. The mediator need 
not be present for mediation to be occurring.   
Snaith v S&A Ltd [2004] 
The fear expressed by Colgan J in Shepherd arose in 
Snaith. The plaintiffs sought exemplary damages for 
threats, humiliation and abuse they alleged the defendants 
engaged in during a mediation hearing. Noting that 
Crummer was no longer good law, the Authority applied 
Shepherd. Even where an injustice may occur, the 
Legislature has made absolute the confidentiality of 
mediation, regardless of what other considerations may 
exist. Cressey (2000) was prophetic when he wrote of 
s148 ERA: 
“This will mean that parties will be able to 
mislead and deceive … by improperly sheltering 
behind the confidentiality of the mediation process 
perjury will go unpunished. It will mean that 
parties will be able to sterilize evidence that is 
unhelpful to their cases by tabling it at mediation 
… It will also mean that a party will be able to 
conceal the fact that at mediation, he or she made 
a threat against the other party … these are 
unintended consequences” (p.1).  
Such ethical issues need addressing. 
Just Hotel Ltd V Jesudhass[2008] 
That opportunity arose but not taken up in Jusudhass. He 
alleged that during the mediation the employer told him 
that he would be dismissed after the mediation, and he 
was. He lodged a personal grievance for unjustified 
dismissal. As part of his case he sought to introduce the 
alleged employer statement made during the mediation. A 
full Bench of the Employment Court gave permission. 
 
The Court held that the cloak of confidentiality is limited 
to actions and communications relevant to resolution of 
the employment issue for which the mediation is 
convened. The alleged statement regarding Jusudhass 
continued employment, being an issue not related to the 
employment issue for which the mediation was convened, 
was therefore not subject to the confidentiality of 
mediation. The employer appealed. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal. The Court took 
counsel for the appellant view that s148(6)(a) allowed use 
of evidence that existed independently of the mediation 
process “thereby making clear that all evidence provided 
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as part of that process is inadmissible” [24]. The 
important point here is that the prohibition applies to 
evidence. 
The Court also noted the submission of the Department of 
Labour to the Select Committee hearing the Employment 
Relations Bill that s148 “… is intended to prevail over the                   
finding in the Crummer case, ensuring that mediation is 
always held on a without prejudice basis. However, 
officials agree that the confidentiality should only attach 
to things said and created for the purposes of the 
mediation and not to pre-existing evidence” [25]. 
The Court held that there was no “ambiguity in the words 
of s148” [31]. Actions and communications made for and 
during mediation are confidential. Writing in the 
Employment Law Bulletin (March, 2008) Robson agreed 
that the meaning of s148 is “clear. It lacks ambiguity” 
(pg.27). While acknowledging the logic, the reasoning is 
suspect. It is unknown what was in the minds of the 
legislators when they passed s148 as part of the 
Employment Relations Act 2000. And given the various 
cases regarding this issue, there is clearly room for 
differing interpretation. And as stated by the appellant’s 
lawyer, the confidentiality applies to ‘all evidence 
provided as part of that process’ (ditto). The Employment 
Court interpretation is the more sensible, namely that 
issues unrelated to the brief for which the mediation is 
held ought not to be covered by the blanket coverage of 
confidentiality. Arguing that the issue is one of degree, 
not principle, the Employment Court position is most 
likely to prevent abuse of the mediation process while 
still achieving the legislative intent. 
In what may be an optimistic interpretation the Court of 
Appeal did not entirely reject the Employment Court 
reasoning. They noted the potential of the existence of a 
public policy interest that could limit or remove the 
provision of confidentiality. Noting s148(2) that a 
mediator cannot give evidence in any proceedings 
regarding the mediation, the Court noted the authority 
presented by the respondent’s lawyer that “if a counsellor 
has before him [or her] a husband and wife and in the 
course of the counselling session one party physically 
attacks another and causes either serious injury or death 
to the other party then surely it would be necessary to 
have the counsellor available to give evidence as to what 
actually occurred” (Milner v Police, 1987, (HC) at 427). 
The evidence would not involve the mediation itself but 
an act outside the mediation brief, a situation similar to 
the Jesudhass case. The Court was not asked and did not 
give an opinion. It is not the purpose here to speculate, it 
is sufficient to note that the door is ajar.  
Te Ao v Chief Executive of the Department of 
Labour [2008] 
The situation described in Milner (1987) is at the extreme 
of when the public interest might override mediation 
confidentiality. Another is the right to present your best 
defence. Mr Te Ao was employed by the Department of 
Labour as a mediator. Arising out of a mediation he was 
accused of inappropriate behaviour. After an investigation 
he was dismissed. He took a personal grievance. The 
Authority asked the Employment Court for a 
determination on whether s148(2)(a) prevented Te Ao 
from giving evidence.   
As noted in the Jesudhass case confidentiality applies to 
the process of mediation. In Te Ao Colgan CJ made a 
distinction between the provision of services and the 
conduct of one of the parties while those services are 
being provided. The Court held that on a literal 
interpretation of s148(a) the prohibition on a mediator 
giving evidence about a mediation is absolute. However, 
applying a purposive interpretation a mediator can give 
evidence not on the provision of services but on the 
conduct of a party to the provision of such services.  
Of note is the comment that “If an analysis of the events 
… about which it is intended that the mediator give 
evidence, are not about the employment relationship 
problem and its resolution, then there is no prohibition 
upon the mediator’s compellability as a witness” [49].  
Noting that it is a matter of judgement and discretion 
whether a comment by a mediator was appropriate, the 
Chief Judge states that where “What the mediator is 
alleged to have said would not have been for the purpose 
of the mediation, to resolve the parties’ employment 
relations problems, and therefore not subject to the 
s148(2) prohibition” [60]. The compatibility of this 
decision with the Court of Appeal in Jesudhass is a matter 
for discussion at another time. Of more certainty is the 
Chief Judge’s decision that in a proceeding it is in the 
public interest that the mediator be allowed to 
defend/explain their actions. This complies with the intent 
of the right of employees to the personal grievance 
procedures and the right to present a best defence. The 
door may be more ajar? 
Rose v The Order of St John [2010] 
In Rose the issue was whether the subject matter of 
mediation could be presented to the Authority. The 
plaintiff argued that the purpose for which the mediation 
was called was not addressed. The defendant argued that 
all communications in mediation are confidential. The 
Employment Court decision is unsurprising. The issue is 
whether what was discussed, or not discussed, at the 
mediation could be stated before the Authority or Court. 
The content of those discussions is confidential. No 
question. But the topic of discussion is not. 
Grey v Murrays Veterinary Clinic Limited 
[2012] 
Lawyers for the applicant and appellant communicated 
with each other. The applicant wanted to use one of the 
correspondence in their personal grievance case. The 
appellant argued that the correspondence was created for 
the purpose of mediation and so confidential (s148(3)). 
The issue is one of fact. The Authority Member found 
parts of the correspondence was the employer’s response 
to the raising of the personal grievance, and so not being 
a document created solely for the purpose of mediation, 
subject to some restrictions, was admissible. What makes 
the case of note is the need for those involved in personal 
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grievance cases to clearly distinguish between material 
raised as a result of the lodging of a personal grievance 
from material specifically raised for use in mediation. 
Such ambiguity is easily avoided if consideration of the 
matter is given at the time of the document creation.  
Hamon v Coromandel Living Trust [2012] 
In Hamon the plaintiff sought the Employment Court’s 
permission to introduce evidence from mediation. The 
plaintiff asserts that a blackmail attempt during the 
mediation satisfies the public interest test referred to by 
the Court of Appeal in Jesudhass (Milner v Police, 1987). 
The defendant challenged this assertion.      
Applying the reasoning of the Chief Judge in Te Ao, it 
could reasonably be assumed that such a waiver to 
confidentiality would be granted on two grounds, namely, 
that blackmail is not part of the purpose for which the 
mediation was called, and it is in the public interest. The 
Chief Mediator has now sought to be a party to the 
hearing. The defendant opposes this. The matter has yet 
to be determined. The argument and likely appeal 
regardless of the decision will be followed with interest.                                    
Conclusion 
Berman (2004), in defending the totality of mediation 
confidentiality notes the distinction between the 
mediation process and the use of information for research 
and educational purposes. This aligns with the 
Employment and Accident Insurance Legislation 
Committee (2000) recommendation, and Parliament’s 
acceptance (s148(6)(b) & (c)) that exceptions from 
confidentiality “need to be limited to those necessary for 
proper administration of the bill and for research” 
(p.163). Unfortunately no reasons for these exceptions are 
given. This is an issue requiring continued consideration 
because of a possible ‘Hawthorne’ effect. 
The degree and coverage of mediation confidentiality is 
an issue in many jurisdictions. There are significant 
public policy issues that support limitations on its 
absoluteness, but in those that we most closely associate 
ourselves with there is unanimity that the absoluteness of 
confidentiality in mediation is worth preserving, albeit 
occasionally at the expense of perceived justice. At 
present the law is well developed but settled? Regardless 
of the outcome of Hamon the issue of confidentiality will 
no doubt continue to engage both judicial and 
parliamentary minds. Watch this space.        
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